奇爱博士

(PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORKER, BY ERIC SCHLOSSER, ON JANUARY 23, 2014)

This month marks the fiftieth anniversary of Stanley Kubrick’s black comedy about nuclear weapons, “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.” Released on January 29, 1964, the film caused a good deal of controversy. Its plot suggested that a mentally deranged American general could order a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, without consulting the President. One reviewer described the film as “dangerous … an evil thing about an evil thing.” Another compared it to Soviet propaganda. Although “Strangelove” was clearly a farce, with the comedian Peter Sellers playing three roles, it was criticized for being implausible. An expert at the Institute for Strategic Studies called the events in the film “impossible on a dozen counts.” A former Deputy Secretary of Defense dismissed the idea that someone could authorize the use of a nuclear weapon without the President’s approval: “Nothing, in fact, could be further from the truth.” (See a compendium of clips from the film.) When “Fail-Safe”—a Hollywood thriller with a similar plot, directed by Sidney Lumet—opened, later that year, it was criticized in much the same way. “The incidents in ‘Fail-Safe’ are deliberate lies!” General Curtis LeMay, the Air Force chief of staff, said. “Nothing like that could happen.” The first casualty of every war is the truth—and the Cold War was no exception to that dictum. Half a century after Kubrick’s mad general, Jack D. Ripper, launched a nuclear strike on the Soviets to defend the purity of “our precious bodily fluids” from Communist subversion, we now know that American officers did indeed have the ability to start a Third World War on their own. And despite the introduction of rigorous safeguards in the years since then, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation hasn’t been completely eliminated.

The command and control of nuclear weapons has long been plagued by an “always/never” dilemma. The administrative and technological systems that are necessary to insure that nuclear weapons are always available for use in wartime may be quite different from those necessary to guarantee that such weapons can never be used, without proper authorization, in peacetime. During the nineteen-fifties and sixties, the “always” in American war planning was given far greater precedence than the “never.” Through two terms in office, beginning in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower struggled with this dilemma. He wanted to retain Presidential control of nuclear weapons while defending America and its allies from attack. But, in a crisis, those two goals might prove contradictory, raising all sorts of difficult questions. What if Soviet bombers were en route to the United States but the President somehow couldn’t be reached? What if Soviet tanks were rolling into West Germany but a communications breakdown prevented NATO officers from contacting the White House? What if the President were killed during a surprise attack on Washington, D.C., along with the rest of the nation’s civilian leadership? Who would order a nuclear retaliation then?

With great reluctance, Eisenhower agreed to let American officers use their nuclear weapons, in an emergency, if there were no time or no means to contact the President. Air Force pilots were allowed to fire their nuclear anti-aircraft rockets to shoot down Soviet bombers heading toward the United States. And about half a dozen high-level American commanders were allowed to use far more powerful nuclear weapons, without contacting the White House first, when their forces were under attack and “the urgency of time and circumstances clearly does not permit a specific decision by the President, or other person empowered to act in his stead.” Eisenhower worried that providing that sort of authorization in advance could make it possible for someone to do “something foolish down the chain of command” and start an all-out nuclear war. But the alternative—allowing an attack on the United States to go unanswered or NATO forces to be overrun—seemed a lot worse. Aware that his decision might create public unease about who really controlled America’s nuclear arsenal, Eisenhower insisted that his delegation of Presidential authority be kept secret. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he confessed to being “very fearful of having written papers on this matter.”

President John F. Kennedy was surprised to learn, just a few weeks after taking office, about this secret delegation of power. “A subordinate commander faced with a substantial military action,” Kennedy was told in a top-secret memo, “could start the thermonuclear holocaust on his own initiative if he could not reach you.” Kennedy and his national-security advisers were shocked not only by the wide latitude given to American officers but also by the loose custody of the roughly three thousand American nuclear weapons stored in Europe. Few of the weapons had locks on them. Anyone who got hold of them could detonate them. And there was little to prevent NATO officers from Turkey, Holland, Italy, Great Britain, and Germany from using them without the approval of the United States.

In December, 1960, fifteen members of Congress serving on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had toured NATO bases to investigate how American nuclear weapons were being deployed. They found that the weapons—some of them about a hundred times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima—were routinely guarded, transported, and handled by foreign military personnel. American control of the weapons was practically nonexistent. Harold Agnew, a Los Alamos physicist who accompanied the group, was especially concerned to see German pilots sitting in German planes that were decorated with Iron Crosses—and carrying American atomic bombs. Agnew, in his own words, “nearly wet his pants” when he realized that a lone American sentry with a rifle was all that prevented someone from taking off in one of those planes and bombing the Soviet Union.

* * *
The Kennedy Administration soon decided to put locking devices inside NATO’s nuclear weapons. The coded electromechanical switches, known as “permissive action links” (PALs), would be placed on the arming lines. The weapons would be inoperable without the proper code—and that code would be shared with NATO allies only when the White House was prepared to fight the Soviets. The American military didn’t like the idea of these coded switches, fearing that mechanical devices installed to improve weapon safety would diminish weapon reliability. A top-secret State Department memo summarized the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961: “all is well with the atomic stockpile program and there is no need for any changes.”

After a crash program to develop the new control technology, during the mid-nineteen-sixties, permissive action links were finally placed inside most of the nuclear weapons deployed by NATO forces. But Kennedy’s directive applied only to the NATO arsenal. For years, the Air Force and the Navy blocked attempts to add coded switches to the weapons solely in their custody. During a national emergency, they argued, the consequences of not receiving the proper code from the White House might be disastrous. And locked weapons might play into the hands of Communist saboteurs. “The very existence of the lock capability,” a top Air Force general claimed, “would create a fail-disable potential for knowledgeable agents to ‘dud’ the entire Minuteman [missile] force.” The Joint Chiefs thought that strict military discipline was the best safeguard against an unauthorized nuclear strike. A two-man rule was instituted to make it more difficult for someone to use a nuclear weapon without permission. And a new screening program, the Human Reliability Program, was created to stop people with emotional, psychological, and substance-abuse problems from gaining access to nuclear weapons.

Despite public assurances that everything was fully under control, in the winter of 1964, while “Dr. Strangelove” was playing in theatres and being condemned as Soviet propaganda, there was nothing to prevent an American bomber crew or missile launch crew from using their weapons against the Soviets. Kubrick had researched the subject for years, consulted experts, and worked closely with a former R.A.F. pilot, Peter George, on the screenplay of the film. George’s novel about the risk of accidental nuclear war, “Red Alert,” was the source for most of “Strangelove” ’s plot. Unbeknownst to both Kubrick and George, a top official at the Department of Defense had already sent a copy of “Red Alert” to every member of the Pentagon’s Scientific Advisory Committee for Ballistic Missiles. At the Pentagon, the book was taken seriously as a cautionary tale about what might go wrong. Even Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara privately worried that an accident, a mistake, or a rogue American officer could start a nuclear war.

Coded switches to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons were finally added to the control systems of American missiles and bombers in the early nineteen-seventies. The Air Force was not pleased, and considered the new security measures to be an insult, a lack of confidence in its personnel. Although the Air Force now denies this claim, according to more than one source I contacted, the code necessary to launch a missile was set to be the same at every Minuteman site: 00000000.

* * *
The early permissive action links were rudimentary. Placed in NATO weapons during the nineteen-sixties and known as Category A PALs, the switches relied on a split four-digit code, with ten thousand possible combinations. If the United States went to war, two people would be necessary to unlock a nuclear weapon, each of them provided with half the code. Category A PALs were useful mainly to delay unauthorized use, to buy time after a weapon had been taken or to thwart an individual psychotic hoping to cause a large explosion. A skilled technician could open a stolen weapon and unlock it within a few hours. Today’s Category D PALs, installed in the Air Force’s hydrogen bombs, are more sophisticated. They require a six-digit code, with a million possible combinations, and have a limited-try feature that disables a weapon when the wrong code is repeatedly entered.

The Air Force’s land-based Minuteman III missiles and the Navy’s submarine-based Trident II missiles now require an eight-digit code—which is no longer 00000000—in order to be launched. The Minuteman crews receive the code via underground cables or an aboveground radio antenna. Sending the launch code to submarines deep underwater presents a greater challenge. Trident submarines contain two safes. One holds the keys necessary to launch a missile; the other holds the combination to the safe with the keys; and the combination to the safe holding the combination must be transmitted to the sub by very-low-frequency or extremely-low-frequency radio. In a pinch, if Washington, D.C., has been destroyed and the launch code doesn’t arrive, the sub’s crew can open the safes with a blowtorch.

The security measures now used to control America’s nuclear weapons are a vast improvement over those of 1964. But, like all human endeavors, they are inherently flawed. The Department of Defense’s Personnel Reliability Program is supposed to keep people with serious emotional or psychological issues away from nuclear weapons—and yet two of the nation’s top nuclear commanders were recently removed from their posts. Neither appears to be the sort of calm, stable person you want with a finger on the button. In fact, their misbehavior seems straight out of “Strangelove.”

Vice Admiral Tim Giardina, the second-highest-ranking officer at the U.S. Strategic Command—the organization responsible for all of America’s nuclear forces—-was investigated last summer for allegedly using counterfeit gambling chips at the Horseshoe Casino in Council Bluffs, Iowa. According to the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation, “a significant monetary amount” of counterfeit chips was involved. Giardina was relieved of his command on October 3, 2013. A few days later, Major General Michael Carey, the Air Force commander in charge of America’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, was fired for conduct “unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.” According to a report by the Inspector General of the Air Force, Carey had consumed too much alcohol during an official trip to Russia, behaved rudely toward Russian officers, spent time with “suspect” young foreign women in Moscow, loudly discussed sensitive information in a public hotel lounge there, and drunkenly pleaded to get onstage and sing with a Beatles cover band at La Cantina, a Mexican restaurant near Red Square. Despite his requests, the band wouldn’t let Carey onstage to sing or to play the guitar.

While drinking beer in the executive lounge at Moscow’s Marriott Aurora during that visit, General Carey made an admission with serious public-policy implications. He off-handedly told a delegation of U.S. national-security officials that his missile-launch officers have the “worst morale in the Air Force.” Recent events suggest that may be true. In the spring of 2013, nineteen launch officers at Minot Air Force base in North Dakota were decertified for violating safety rules and poor discipline. In August, 2013, the entire missile wing at Malmstrom Air Force base in Montana failed its safety inspection. Last week, the Air Force revealed that thirty-four launch officers at Malmstrom had been decertified for cheating on proficiency exams—and that at least three launch officers are being investigated for illegal drug use. The findings of a report by the RAND Corporation, leaked to the A.P., were equally disturbing. The study found that the rates of spousal abuse and court martials among Air Force personnel with nuclear responsibilities are much higher than those among people with other jobs in the Air Force. “We don’t care if things go properly,” a launch officer told RAND. “We just don’t want to get in trouble.”

The most unlikely and absurd plot element in “Strangelove” is the existence of a Soviet “Doomsday Machine.” The device would trigger itself, automatically, if the Soviet Union were attacked with nuclear weapons. It was meant to be the ultimate deterrent, a threat to destroy the world in order to prevent an American nuclear strike. But the failure of the Soviets to tell the United States about the contraption defeats its purpose and, at the end of the film, inadvertently causes a nuclear Armageddon. “The whole point of the Doomsday Machine is lost,” Dr. Strangelove, the President’s science adviser, explains to the Soviet Ambassador, “if you keep it a secret!”

A decade after the release of “Strangelove,” the Soviet Union began work on the Perimeter system—-a network of sensors and computers that could allow junior military officials to launch missiles without oversight from the Soviet leadership. Perhaps nobody at the Kremlin had seen the film. Completed in 1985, the system was known as the Dead Hand. Once it was activated, Perimeter would order the launch of long-range missiles at the United States if it detected nuclear detonations on Soviet soil and Soviet leaders couldn’t be reached. Like the Doomsday Machine in “Strangelove,” Perimeter was kept secret from the United States; its existence was not revealed until years after the Cold War ended.

In retrospect, Kubrick’s black comedy provided a far more accurate description of the dangers inherent in nuclear command-and-control systems than the ones that the American people got from the White House, the Pentagon, and the mainstream media.

“This is absolute madness, Ambassador,” President Merkin Muffley says in the film, after being told about the Soviets’ automated retaliatory system. “Why should you build such a thing?” Fifty years later, that question remains unanswered, and “Strangelove” seems all the more brilliant, bleak, and terrifyingly on the mark.



___________________________________


AND THIS IS REALLY COOL:
Top secret documents released by the Pentagon:
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/primary-sources-permissive-action-links-and-the-threat-of-nuclear-war.html

   一架和五角大楼失去联系的B52轰炸机孤独地承载着毁灭世界的任务。
    一路昂扬地飞过身下美丽的高山大河，平原深谷，飞过欧洲大陆，飞向苏联……
　　配乐是一段在原声带里被命名为《炸弹快跑》（Bomb Run）的无歌词男声哼唱。
　　
　　无歌词哼唱用得是地方的话，能起到插曲和配乐没有的奇效。
　　《奇爱博士》里这一段就很动人，记忆里只有《一个和八个》开头日出时候的那段可以比。
　　以下是对这段配乐出处的考证过程。
　　
　　1.关于《奇爱博士》里一段配乐的问题
　　《奇爱博士》里面用得很多的一段，最早出现是在10分左右，B52轰炸机向基地确认了用核武器袭击苏联的R计划的时候。
　　音乐是军号伴着鼓点，调子很好听，很振奋。像在给出征的战士鼓劲儿似的。
　　
　　最早听到它是在一首joan baez歌<Johnny I hardly knew ye>，演唱年代不祥，大致在五十到七十年代之间。歌词是以一个伤兵妻子的口吻写的，是反战的。因为调子很明快上口，我一听之下觉得应该是很有名的歌，但搜索歌词，却发现歌词居然没有统一的版本，和joan baez相关的网页也不多。这可能说明这首歌早就有了，且有很多人翻唱过。后查到歌词节选改编自爱尔兰诗人Padraic Colum（1881－1972）1922年编选的一本爱尔兰诗集里的一首诗，是没有留下作者的民歌。民歌里出现的地点Athy也是一个爱尔兰地名。
　　
　　那这段音乐是不是专门为这首诗谱的曲？还是它本来是一段军乐，后来有人取反讽之意，改成了反战的民谣？
　　
　　继听过joan baez的版本后，又在一个月之内听到过两次这个调子。一是在Sex and the City里，主角Carrie和人闲聊的时候说到和战争有关的话题，Carrie表示她对此有所了解，就哼了一小句。
　　二是看电视频道换到某台在演《女子特警队》，队员们受训时给她们放投影的军事教学片，那个好像是国外军队演习的场面配的也是这段音乐。
　　据此我觉得它最初是一段军乐的可能性比较大，那它是哪一国的军乐，从什么时候开始有的呢？
　　
　　2.糊涂了
　　其实有了dr. strangelove这么有名的片子答案是不难找的
　　算是部分答案吧：
　　The score for the B-52 scenes is mostly made up of the melody of "Johnny, I Hardly Knew Ye", a traditional Irish anti-war song, which also provides the melody for the somewhat better-known (at least in the United States) American Civil War song "When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again". While the former tells the story of a soldier coming back from a war heavily mutilated and broken, with the last lines being "They're rolling out the guns again, but they'll never take my sons again", the latter describes the celebrations that will take place when the soldiers return from war: "The men will cheer and the boys will shout / The ladies they will all turn out / And we'll all feel gay / When Johnny comes marching home."
　　
　　美国南北战争期间，一位爱尔兰裔南方军队乐队指挥Patrick S. Gilmore把一首抗议英格兰征兵的爱尔兰反战民歌Johnny,I Hardly Knew ye（《强尼，我快认不出你了》）改成了欢迎战士凯旋的歌When Johnny Comes Marching Home（《当强尼凯旋归家时》）。
　　事实上，这首曲调上口的歌在战时广为流传，南北方的军民都在唱。
　　
　　carrie是时尚女，她如果知道一首古老的爱尔兰民歌是奇怪的，但她知道南北战争的歌并用它来表达对“战争“的了解，就很容易解释了。
　　女子特警队员看的教学片很有可能是关于美国的。
　　
　　老库的心思一向用得很狠，此处对待战争的两层潜文本也算一例。
　　他这部片子里的戏谑、疯狂和黑暗与johnny,i hardly knew ye是一致的。johnny这样形似armless,boneless,chickenless egg的怪物，和核弹一样，都是人类不断进步的必然产物，它们既是人性的，也是非人性的，既是原始野蛮的，也是现代文明的。它们的产生和侵蚀对于人类而言是不可避免的，而所有一切的终结，就和dr.strangelove的结局一样，是一场美丽的终极毁灭。
　　
　　3.补上这两首歌的歌词
　　1）.When johnny comes marching home again
　　This is generally credited to the Union Army bandmaster, Patrick S. Gilmore, who wrote it in 1863. It is similar to the Irish song Johnny I Hardly Knew Ye(a tale of a maimed soldier returning from war). Which version came first is debated.
　　
　　When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again,
　　Hurrah! Hurrah!
　　We'll give him a hearty welcome then
　　Hurrah! Hurrah!
　　The men will cheer and the boys will shout
　　The ladies they will all turn out
　　And we'll all feel gay,
　　When Johnny comes marching home.
　　
　　The old church bell will peal with joy
　　Hurrah! Hurrah!
　　To welcome home our darling boy
　　Hurrah! Hurrah!
　　The village lads and lassies say
　　With roses they will strew the way,
　　And we'll all feel gay
　　When Johnny comes marching home.
　　
　　Get ready for the Jubilee,
　　Hurrah! Hurrah!
　　We'll give the hero three times three,
　　Hurrah! Hurrah!
　　The laurel wreath is ready now
　　To place upon his loyal brow
　　And we'll all feel gay
　　When Johnny comes marching home.
　　
　　2）.Johnny, I Hardly Knew Ye
　　
　　By Anonymous
　　Padraic Colum (1881–1972). Anthology of Irish Verse. 1922.
　　
　　WHILE going the road to sweet Athy,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　While going the road to sweet Athy,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　While going the road to sweet Athy,
　　A stick in my hand and a drop in my eye,
　　A doleful damsel I heard cry:
　　 “Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　
　　“With drums and guns, and guns and drums,
　　The enemy nearly slew ye;
　　My darling dear, you look so queer,
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　
　　“Where are your eyes that looked so mild?
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　Where are your eyes that looked so mild?
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　Where are your eyes that looked so mild,
　　When my poor heart you first beguiled?
　　Why did you run from me and the child?
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　 With drums, etc.
　　
　　“Where are the legs with which you run?
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　Where are thy legs with which you run?
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　Where are the legs with which you run
　　When first you went to carry a gun?
　　Indeed, your dancing days are done!
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　 With drums, etc.
　　
　　It grieved my heart to see you sail,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　It grieved my heart to see you sail,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　It grieved my heart to see you sail,
　　Though from my heart you took leg-bail;
　　Like a cod you’re doubled up head and tail,
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　 With drums, etc.
　　
　　“You haven’t an arm and you haven’t a leg,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　You haven’t an arm and you haven’t a leg,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　You haven’t an arm and you haven’t a leg,
　　You’re an eyeless, noseless, chickenless egg;
　　You’ll have to be put with a bowl to beg:
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　 With drums, etc.
　　
　　“I’m happy for to see you home,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　I’m happy for to see you home,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　I’m happy for to see you home,
　　All from the Island of Sulloon;
　　So low in flesh, so high in bone;
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　 With drums, etc.
　　
　　“But sad it is to see you so,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　But sad it is to see you so,
　　 Hurroo! hurroo!
　　But sad it is to see you so,
　　And to think of you now as an object of woe,
　　Your Peggy’ll still keep you on as her beau;
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye!
　　
　　With drums and guns, and guns and drums,
　　The enemy nearly slew ye;
　　My darling dear, you look so queer,
　　 Och, Johnny, I hardly knew ye.
　　
　　3）．Johnny I hardly knew ye（joan baez演唱版，附试译）
　　
　　Joan Baze常常以简单的配乐衬托她同样简单却在朴实中见动人之处的声音。她演绎的这首老歌，除了表示妻子坚定信念的最后一节的伴唱，模拟军乐队的打鼓声压倒了其他所有隐约可辨的配乐。歌声和鼓点相呼应，节奏感强烈得仿佛一首军歌，而她歌唱的是这样一个在战争中失去四肢和双眼的士兵，惊悚、残忍、痛苦和反讽缠绕在一起，直到最后妻子唱出自己的决心：再也不让那些制造枪支的人夺走他们的孩子。
　　然而，那是她能决定的事吗？对于那些人她又是什么呢？
　　也许，她只是平凡，渺小，普通，充满着世界各个角落的垫在金字塔最底层的奴隶，而这个世界属于奥林匹亚山上的少数神明，为了永远不能到达的“永恒”，让他们主宰的艺术世界成为可能，艰难地活着的人类的痛苦不得不永续不熄。
　　战争，永远睡在你我身边，凡人不知道她什么时候醒来。
　　
　　With your guns and drums
　　And drums and guns
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　With your guns and drums
　　And drums and guns
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　With your guns and drums
　　And drums and guns
　　The enemy nearly slew ye
　　My darling，dear，you look so queer
　　Johnny i hardly knew ye
　　带着你的枪和鼓和鼓和枪
　　带着你的枪和鼓和鼓和枪
　　带着你的枪和鼓和鼓和枪
　　敌人差点杀了你
　　我心爱的，亲爱的，你看起来这样怪异
　　强尼，我差点认不出你
　　
　　Where are your legs that used to run
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　Where are your legs that used to run
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　Where are your legs that used to run
　　Before you left carrying a gun
　　I fear your dancing days are done
　　Johnny I hardly knew ye
　　你过去习惯奔跑的双腿在哪里？
　　你过去习惯奔跑的双腿在哪里？
　　你过去习惯奔跑的双腿在哪里？
　　在你持枪离开前（习惯奔跑的双腿）
　　我怕你跳舞的日子结束了
　　强尼，我差点认不出你
　　
　　Where are your eyes that were so mild
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　Where are your eyes that were so mild
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　Where are your eyes that were so mild
　　When my heart you did beguile
　　And why did ye run from me and the child
　　Johnny I hardly knew ye
　　你过去如此温和的双眼在哪里？
　　你过去如此温和的双眼在哪里？
　　你过去如此温和的双眼在哪里？
　　那时你让我的心陶醉
　　可你为什么离开我和孩子
　　强尼，我差点认不出你
　　
　　Ye haven't an arm ye haven't a leg
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　Ye haven't an arm ye haven't a leg
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　Ye haven't an arm ye haven't a leg
　　Ye're an armless boneless chickenless egg
　　and ye'll have to be put with a bowl to beg
　　Johnny I hardly knew ye
　　你没有胳臂，你没有腿
　　你没有胳臂，你没有腿
　　你没有胳臂，你没有腿
　　你是一只没有胳膊，没有腿也没有小鸡的蛋
　　你不得不和一只碗放在一起去乞讨
　　强尼，我差点认不出你
　　
　　They're rolling out the guns again
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　They're rolling out the guns again
　　Hurroo hurroo
　　They're rolling out the guns again
　　But they won't take back our sons again
　　No they never take back our sons again
　　Johnny I'm swearing to ye
　　他们又在大量制造枪支
　　他们又在大量制造枪支
　　他们又在大量制造枪支
　　但他们再也不会收回我们的儿子们
　　不，他们永远不会再次收回我们的儿子们
　　强尼，我向你发誓
　　
　　附记：
　　
　　库布里克除了喜欢改编别人的小说，也喜欢用前人的音乐，尤其是古典音乐配现代的非人性的场景。经典的比如《发条橙子》里的贝多芬，如《2001太空漫游》里的《查拉图斯特拉如是说》和《蓝色多瑙河》。有人说，在这部电影里听《蓝色多瑙河》，心里咒骂着库布里克真是个天才，自己也快想发疯了。
　　人性与非人性的探讨也许是库布里克最核心的关注点。
　　他的高明在于他没有完全站在理性、文明、民主、自由的一方而对alex、jack、dr. strangelove这些现代畸形人完全持谴责批判的态度。这些人所呈现的非人性可能也是人性不可或缺的一部分，他的故事把他们与奉行现代社会框定的“善”之价值的人们共同呈现在一个个疯狂的境遇下，让观众自己思考。这就不难理解他为什么不喜欢《斯巴达克思》，恨不能把它从作品列表里删除，因为它一边倒，它是“人性”的，太“人性”的了。

90分钟世界毁灭

库布里克的《奇爱博士》Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb是冷战讽刺喜剧经典，描写疯狂将军指派轰炸机群干掉苏联，为防止苏联按下“世界末日装置”，美国总统在作战室里闹翻天。

《奇爱博士》的投资180万美元，哥伦比亚公司愿意投资本片的唯一条件是：彼得·塞勒斯必须演四个以上的主要角色。此前，哥伦比亚公司的高层看了库布里克的《一树梨花压海棠》(1962)，见过塞勒斯惊人的演技。塞勒斯在影片拍摄前，原定确实要演四个角色：美国总统、英国军官、奇爱博士和B-52轰炸机机长。但在开拍后，塞勒斯却不愿意演机长这个角色，因为他感觉自己的工作量太大了，而且他也对自己无法掌握机长的德州口音而有些担忧。库布里克说服了塞勒斯，让人录了一卷台词录音带给他。塞勒斯照着录音带背好了台词，但在拍摄现场却因为在狭小的驾驶舱布景里扭伤了脚踝，因此只能放弃这个角色。

奇爱博士的形象来自于美国未来学家赫尔曼·康恩、曼哈顿计划的主管约翰·冯、纽曼、德国导弹之父冯·布劳恩。这个角色后来还被人引申为亨利·基辛格，但其实在1960年代初期他还只是个写了几本关于核战策略书籍的哈佛大学教授而已（但库布里克已经阅读过他的文章了）。奇爱博士古怪的奥地利口音的英语来自于库布里克雇佣的摄影师Weegee，奇爱博士的手套则是塞勒斯问库布里克借的。

由于此时彼得·塞勒斯正在闹离婚，无法离开英国，因此《奇爱博士》全程在伦敦的谢普敦片场拍摄。三个主要摄影棚被用来搭建五角大楼作战室、B-52轰炸机、瑞普将军的办公室等场景。影片的场景设计是大名鼎鼎的肯·亚当，他此后成为了多部007电影的场景设计。作战室的设计是超现实的，从《卡利加里博士的小屋》和《大都会》获得灵感，这个作战室有130英尺长、100英尺宽、35英尺高，环绕的日光灯看上去像是一个蘑菇云环。库布里克坚持要在圆桌上铺满绿色毛毡，虽然这在黑白片里根本看不出来，但他希望让演员有一种在巨大的赌台上表演的感觉。

影片拍摄中，库布里克得知有一部名为《核战爆发令》的影片的剧情与《奇爱博士》相类似，虽然那部影片是超现实惊悚片，但库布里克仍担忧相同题材的影片会毁了《奇爱博士》的票房，尤其是对方的阵容相当尖挺：导演西德尼·吕美特（《十二怒汉》）、主演亨利·方达（《愤怒的葡萄》）。于是，库布里克用出了狠招：起诉。哥伦比亚公司和库布里克对《核战爆发令》提起了诉讼，这让《核战爆发令》的档期被推迟到了《奇爱博士》上映八个月后。

但《奇爱博士》也非常倒霉，1963年11月22日，《奇爱博士》做了首场试映。就在这一天，美国总统约翰·肯尼迪在达拉斯遇刺身亡，影片的档期只能推迟到1964年1月，哥伦比亚公司甚至给一句含有“达拉斯”的台词进行了重新配音，改为“赌城”，另外还有一场讽刺总统的砸派戏被删除。在次年的奥斯卡奖上，《奇爱博士》虽然获得了四项提名，但全部落空，讽刺冷战的杰作《奇爱博士》就此被大时代淹没。

当然，优秀的电影永远不会被遗忘，《奇爱博士》此后慢慢成为了最伟大的反战电影之一，在IMDb的最佳影片250名中排名第28、美国电影学院2000年评选的最伟大喜剧片第3名、美国电影学院2007年的百年百大佳片第39名。


从DVD到蓝光

《奇爱博士》在DVD曾推出过多个版本，值得一提的包括1999年哥伦比亚公司第一版（无花絮）、2001年哥伦比亚公司特别版（携带幕后制作纪录片花絮）、2003年日本二区超码版、2004年40周年特别版（双碟配置）。这几个版本里争议最大的当属40周年特别版，因为此前的版本都是1.33：1全屏格式，而这个版是1.66：1可变宽屏。大家都知道库布里克去世前的除了《2001漫游太空》之外的音像制品都是全屏格式，而今出来的这个宽屏版，画面明显有裁切，但哥伦比亚公司却宣称此片的当年上映比例就是1.66：1的。
 

2009年6月16日，索尼公司发行《奇爱博士》45周年特别版蓝光，将这部经典的画面升级为1080p格式，正片仍是可变宽屏1.66：1。花絮方面，蓝光碟除了将所有的DVD花絮照单全收之外，还增加了一条琐事字幕，全面介绍冷战期间的历史背景以及拍摄内幕。


华纳公司在去年推出了书+碟的蓝光包装后，曾被网友公干为“史上最失败的包装”，索尼公司不知道哪根筋搭错，居然照原样仿制了这个包装，《奇爱博士》就是索尼的第一个试验品。除了碟之外，还附赠一本32页的画册。与40周年特别版DVD随碟附赠的画册内容完全不同（这个版本里有罗杰·伊伯特撰写的影评）。

完整图片版请参见：
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_53867c1d0100entd.html

    电影课的老师让我认识了库布里克。于是找来了他的几部片来看。如果说《洛丽塔》出彩的地方还是在演员的话，那么这部《奇爱博士》真的是展现了库布里克的天才之处。

    同样是反冷战题材，如果让我拍，根据小学作文中学到的以小见大的方法，我可能会选取一两个平凡人，描写冷战对他们生活的冲击。我看过一些反映一个大时代背景（战争，文革等）的片子都采用了这种手法。或者我们也可以干脆来个大场面，描写一下美苏有多少新式武器，国内有多少反战游行示威……

    我等终究还是凡人，看看大师是怎么拍的吧。谁都没想到的是库布里克把这一题材拍成了一部黑色幽默剧。几十架载着核弹的B52、靠蒙就能猜出来的绝密密码、会议室里将军轻松调侃的语气、美国总统在电话里不停的叫着苏联总理的小名……这些看上去有些荒谬的元素组合在一起，期间再穿插一些类似生存箱那样的小幽默。不知道的还以为这是一部喜剧。但就是这样的方法，像一连串的冷笑话将冷战大大的鄙视了一番。冷战是什么？不过是政客们在会议室玩的过家家游戏罢了。

    影片里有三个细节让我难忘，一个是在基地的将军决定将错就错不发出撤回B52的命令时给他的那个稍微仰视的镜头，那个镜头给人的感觉不是伟岸，而是一种征服的狰狞和满足。人类中的一些人总是希望能够征服别人并从中获得快感，只要这种人还在，冷战，或者类似的竞赛就不会结束。第二个细节是Dr.strangelove时时扬起右臂作出的那个手势。他的残疾，代表着整个人类社会的畸形：一方面是极度聪明的头脑，另一方面确是对纳粹的信仰。在人类走投无路的时候需要仰仗自己智慧的头脑，然而最终也是智慧毁掉了人类自己。第三个是在核弹终于爆炸，苏联启动了毁面世界的程序之后，美国政要们关心的居然是幸存者们冷战的继续。同时，苏联大使也在忙着偷拍会议室中的机密。死到临头之际，人们还在忙着这种事，啼笑皆非之余不免会感到悲哀……